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Abstract—We show that correlations between the camera used
to acquire an image and the class label of that image can
be exploited by convolutional neural networks (CNN), resulting
in a model that “cheats” at an image classification task by
recognizing which camera took the image and inferring the
class label from the camera. We show that models trained on
a dataset with camera / label correlations do not generalize well
to images in which those correlations are absent, nor to images
from unencountered cameras. Furthermore, we investigate which
visual features they are exploiting for camera recognition. Our
experiments present evidence against the importance of global
color statistics, lens deformation and chromatic aberration, and
in favor of high frequency features, which may be introduced by
image processing algorithms built into the cameras.
I. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) sometimes learn to
satisfy their objective functions in ways we do not intend,
typically by exploiting some subtle idiosyncrasy in the training
data. For example, in [8] a CNN trained on ImageNet was
found to be recognizing chocolate sauce pots by the presence
of a spoon, because many of the chocolate sauce pots in
the ImageNet dataset are indeed accompanied by a silver
spoon. While effective at minimizing the loss function at
training time, these clever exploits usually result in the model
becoming brittle, as it is relying on characteristics that are
specific to the training set and are not representative of the
wider world. This tends to manifest as domain bias, whereby
the model fails to generalise well to instances from other
datasets with different idiosyncrasies.
We investigate a real world applied computer vision problem
in which severe domain bias was caused by strong correlations
between camera model and class label. Since the training
dataset consists of two classes acquired with different cameras,
the model learns to predict the class label by recognizing the
camera that captured the image. Since the sets of cameras used
to acquire the two classes are non intersecting, this is sufficient
to achieve perfect training accuracy, whilst learning nothing
about the task itself. Our task has characteristics typical of
industrial deep vision projects, and we believe the lessons
learned will be useful to many deep learning practitioners
working on similar projects. By illuminating the sometimes
counterintuitive means by which CNNs can classify images,
our work is also relevant to the ongoing quest for algorithmic
transparency and accountability in machine learning.
The task itself is to discriminate between shampoo bottles
from two different manufacturers, which are distinguished only
by very small differences in the printing of a batch code on
the underside of the bottle. These differences are caused by
different industrial printers being used, are independent of the
actual character string that is printed, and are subtle enough
that detecting them by eye is difficult even for trained experts.
This therefore constitutes a fine grained binary classification
problem, in which the intra-class variance is high relative to
the inter-class variance.
Fine grained classification is difficult, so one might intu-
itively expect a model to cheat more often on such tasks, if
the correct decision function is more complex compared to a
cheating rule. On the other hand, in this instance the exploit
of recognizing cameras is also a fine grained classification
task, and in general it is not obvious which tasks are “harder”
for a CNN to learn. CNNs have been known to cheat by
detecting patterns which are barely perceptible to humans,
such as chromatic aberration [6]. CycleGAN even cheats its
reconstruction loss by inserting steganographic codes into
its converted images, which it then uses to reconstruct the
originals [3].
In this paper, we closely examine an instance of a model
cheating on a real world visual classification task, and attempt
to answer the following questions:
1) Is it possible for a CNN to recognize camera types when
explicitly trained to do so?
2) Can we prove that the same CNN cheats on the task
of manufacturer classification by recognizing camera
types?
3) Does the propensity toward cheating depend on model
architecture?
4) How exactly does a CNN recognize camera types?
Section II reviews relevant literature in fine grained classi-
fication and overfitting, while Section III describes out dataset
and classification task in detail. Section IV investigates the
above questions systematically with a series of experiments,
and in Section V we discuss our findings and draw conclu-
sions.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Two major branches of literature are relevant to our work:
source camera identification from images, and understanding
deep neural networks.
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A. Camera / Image Sensor Pattern Identification
Because our work concerns accidental camera detection,
a brief review of deliberate camera detection methods is
warranted, as it may shed some light on how our model
learns to cheat. Many techniques have been developed to trace
digital photos back to their camera of origin, primarily by the
digital forensics community [9]. Such techniques can be used
to detect doctored images or videos, where images or frames
from different cameras are spliced together [4], [5]. Most
of these methods revolve around extracting a unique sensor
noise fingerprint from the image, and matching it against the
reference patterns of known cameras. Since sensor noise is
a complex phenomenon with multiple sources (e.g. photonic
noise, lens imperfections, dust particles, dark currents, non-
uniform pixel sensitivity), there are many ways of doing this.
Geradts et al. [10] identify cameras by their unique patterns of
dead and hot pixels, however not all cameras have dead pixels,
and some remove them via post-processing. Kharrazi et al.
[13] train an SVM to recognize five different cameras based on
hand-engineered feature vectors extracted from images. This
approach achieves up to 95% classification accuracy, but this
is too low for forensic purposes. Choi et al. [2] take a similar
SVM based approach, additionally showing that radial lens
distortion is a useful feature for identifying cameras. Unlike
noise based approaches, lens distortion can identify models of
camera but not individuals. Kurosawa et al. [15] recognizes
cameras by dark current noise, which is a small, constant
signal emitted by a CCD, varying randomly from pixel to
pixel. Although every digital camera has such a noise pattern
and it will always be unique, it can only be acquired from dark
frames where no light strikes the sensor, and is only a small
component of sensor noise. Lukas et al. [16] propose a more
robust method that exploits the non-uniform sensitivity to light
among sensor pixels, which is a much stronger component and
does not require dark frames to measure.
Another feature of consumer cameras that has thwarted a
previous deep learning experiment [6] is chromatic aberration,
in which different wavelengths of light are refracted by differ-
ent amounts by the lens. This results in colored fringes around
the edges of objects. This too has been used in digital forensics
[12].
Recently, CNN-based methods have shown great potential
in digital camera identification from images using standard
supervised training [1], [25], [26], proving that CNNs are
indeed able to infer which camera acquired a digital image.
B. Understanding Deep Convolutional Neural Networks
CNNs are often seen as something of a black box, with no
clear consensus as to what information they are using to reach
their decisions, how that information is represented internally,
or what are the specific roles of their individual components.
Attempts to answer these questions can be divided into two
strands, feature visualization and attribution.
Feature visualization aims to clarify the function of neurons
or channels, by synthesizing images that maximize their ac-
tivation [20]. Simonyan et al. [22] investigate what patterns
CNNs look for in each image class by performing gradient
ascent in image space, to maximize the activation of an
output class neuron. Yosinski et al. [27] do the same but with
better regularization, producing more natural looking images.
Mahendran et al. [17] treat intermediate CNN representations
as functions which they can invert via gradient ascent in image
space. This yields images that the CNN maps to the same
representation as the original image, implying that they “look
the same” to the CNN. Nguyen et al. [18] find natural looking
images that maximally activate feature maps by searching the
manifold learned by a generative adversarial network, rather
than the full image space. Fong et al. [7] show evidence
that far from feature maps learning separate, well defined
concepts, the relationship between feature maps and semantic
concepts is many-to-many, with each feature map involved in
the detection of several concepts and most concepts activating
multiple feature maps.
Attribution investigates which parts of an image contribute
most to a CNN’s decision - often expressed as “where the
model is looking”. Zeiler and Fergus [28] propose two meth-
ods to this end: occlusion mapping, in which the importance
of an image patch is measured as the reduction in class
probability when it is obscured, and backpropagation of class
probability gradients into image pixels. Both of these methods
yield saliency maps showing which parts of the image have
the greatest effect on the output when changed, corresponding
to the notion of how much they contributed to the network’s
decision. Another popular approach is guided backpropagation
[23], which refines the gradient saliency maps of [28] by
zeroing out negative gradients at every backpropagation step,
so as to focus only on image parts that contribute positively
to a particular class. A much faster alternative to occlusion
mapping (which must run a forward pass for each test patch)
is class activation mapping (CAM) [29], which uses final
layer feature maps as saliency maps, weighted and summed
according to the weight of their connection to the class neuron
in question. This approach requires that the output layer takes
its input directly from mean pooled feature maps (as is the
case with GoogLeNet and ResNet but not for networks with
fully connected layers such as AlexNet). Selvaraju et al. [21]
address this by using mean pooled gradients as a proxy for
direct connection weights, allowing feature maps from any
layer in any network to be used as saliency maps. Another
technique by Fong et al. [8] learns a mask that causes a
model to misclassify an image while obscuring the smallest
area possible.
III. DATASET
Our dataset consists of 3090 RGB images of the undersides
of shampoo bottles. These images are of size 1024×1024 and
are cropped tightly around the bottle’s batch code, which is a
two-line alphanumeric serial number printed by a dot matrix
printer (see Figure 1). The crops are from roughly the same
area of the original images, so they should cover mostly the
same region of the cameras’ sensors. This means they should
contain roughly the same sensor pattern noise, up to some
Fig. 1. A pair of images from our dataset. The left was taken with an iPhone
camera, while the right was taken with a Samsung.
random translation. The batch codes of the two manufacturers’
products are expected to differ in some potentially very subtle
ways, hence the relatively high resolution of our images.
Our images are captured with five different cameras: iPhone,
Huawei, Samsung, Redmi and Vivo. In the base dataset these
cameras occur at equal frequencies among the two manufac-
turers, but by excluding certain combinations of camera and
label from the dataset, we can introduce correlations between
camera type and class label. Since we were aware of the
camera bias issue at the time our dataset was collected, care
was taken to remove all sources of domain bias (e.g. different
people photographing bottles from each manufacturer, and
perhaps holding the bottles differently). To this end, the images
were acquired by four different people who each photographed
an equal number of images from each manufacturer and with
each camera, all in the same room, under controlled lighting
conditions. This means that domain bias should only exist if
we deliberately induce it by excluding certain manufacturer
/ camera combinations. It also means that background dis-
tractors should be uncorrelated with manufacturer and camera
type. The test set is a random 10% of the samples, on which
the model is never trained.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
To address the questions raised in Section I, we run a
series of classification experiments on variations of our dataset
with camera/label correlation artificially introduced. All exper-
iments are trained to convergence with the Adam optimizer
[14], using a learning rate of 10−4, a weight decay of 0, and the
categorical cross entropy loss function. All accuracy numbers
we report are averaged over four runs with different random
number generator seeds. We perform all our experiments with
five commonly used CNN architectures, all of which are
pretrained on ImageNet and fine-tuned on our tasks with no
layer freezing.
A. Camera Classification
As a basic sanity check, we verify here that state of the art
vision models can very easily classify which camera took the
image in this dataset. This corroborates the work of [1] [25] for
our own datasets and cameras. Table I shows that very high
Fig. 2. A pretrained ResNet34 model learns to recognize manufacturers very
quickly, and learns to recognize cameras even faster.
test accuracies can be achieved on this task across a range
of architectures. As Figure 2 shows, a pretrained ResNet34
not only achieves high accuracy at camera classification but
does so very quickly. Camera recognition is learned faster than
manufacturer recognition, suggesting that a model which can
minimize its loss by recognizing manufacturers or by cheating
by camera recognition will tend toward the latter, as it is
somehow easier.
Model Test Accuracy
ResNet34 0.999
ResNet101 0.913
InceptionV3 0.998
AlexNet 0.945
VGG16 0.974
TABLE I
ACCURACY ON THE TEST SET WHEN CLASSIFYING WHICH CAMERA TOOK
AN IMAGE.
B. Manufacturer Classification
We investigate our primary task, manufacturer classification,
under three settings, which we refer to as Balanced, Partial,
and Disjoint. In the Balanced setting, we use the full training
set and there are no correlations between camera type and
class label. In Partial, we use the same training set but with
only iPhone and Samsung cameras included. In Disjoint, we
introduce correlations between camera and class label by
including only Manufacturer 1 images taken with iPhone or
Samsung cameras, and Manufacturer 2 images taken with
Huawei or Redmi cameras. Our test set is the same in all
cases, balanced across camera types with no camera/label
correlations.
Table II shows the results of manufacturer classification
experiments on these three datasets. It is immediately apparent
that while respectable accuracy is achieved when training on
the Balanced dataset, an accuracy drop of around 30% occurs
when training on Disjoint. In fact, Disjoint accuracy is close
to 50%, hardly better than random guessing, which is entirely
expected if the model were basing its classifications on camera
Model Balanced Partial Disjoint
ResNet34 0.974 0.957 0.505
ResNet101 0.969 0.921 0.505
InceptionV3 0.973 0.940 0.518
AlexNet 0.929 0.893 0.573
VGG16 0.979 0.945 0.556
TABLE II
MANUFACTURER CLASSIFICATION TEST SET ACCURACY OF FIVE MODELS
WITH DIFFERENT TRAINING SETUPS.
Fig. 3. Test accuracy plot showing the distribution of predicted labels among
correct outputs, for a ResNet34 trained on the Disjoint training set, in which
all Manufacturer 1 images are iPhone or Samsung, and all Manufacturer 2
are Huawei or Redmi. For images from iPhone and Samsung cameras the
model predicts only Manufacturer 1, while for Huawei and Redmi it predicts
only Manufacturer 2, while for the unseen Vivo images it appears to guess
randomly, achieving 54% accuracy with a mostly even mix of both classes.
Best viewed in color.
types, each of which has an equal number of images of each
class in the test set.
We can confirm that this drop in accuracy is due to camera
bias by observing the model’s behavior across camera types
in the test set. As Figure 3 shows, a ResNet34 trained on the
Disjoint dataset predicts Manufacturer 1 exclusively on test
images acquired by iPhone or Samsung cameras, and Man-
ufacturer 2 overwhelmingly on Huawei and Redmi images.
Similar behavior is observed in the other models.
It is interesting to note that AlexNet and VGG16 both score
higher test accuracy after training on Disjoint than their more
modern counterparts, ResNet34, ResNet101 and InceptionV3.
One possible explanation for this is that AlexNet and VGG16
both use fully connected layers to produce their final output,
while the more recent networks are fully convolutional, i.e.
using a global average pooling layer to convert the final feature
maps into a fixed size vector that is then classified by a single
fully connected output layer. Fully connected layers have one
parameter per input unit and hence require fixed size input,
whereas convolutional layers can process arbitrary sized input
by using the same convolutional weights at every location in
the input. AlexNet and VGG16 therefore require input images
to be downsampled to 224 × 224, whereas the fully convo-
lutional networks receive the full 1024 × 1024 images. This
suggests that camera identification exploits high frequency
Fig. 4. Test accuracy plot showing the distribution of predicted labels among
correct outputs, for a ResNet34 trained on the Partial training set, in which
camera type is uncorrelated with class label but only iPhone and Samsung
images are present. Overall accuracy across all camera types is close to
that achieved when trained on the full dataset, with little bias in favor of
familiar camera types. This implies that in the absence of camera / label
correlations, the model learns robust features for manufacturer classification,
which generalize well to images from unseen cameras. Best viewed in color.
features (as opposed to geometric distortions caused by lens
variations), which are partly destroyed during downsampling,
thus preventing AlexNet and VGG16 from exploiting them.
When training on the Partial dataset, where only iPhone and
Samsung images are present but no camera/label correlation
exists, test accuracy is broadly similar to training on the full
(Balanced) dataset. Not only is accuracy high, but as Figure 4
shows, the model performs well on the unseen cameras. This
implies that in the absence of camera/label correlation, the
model learns a robust classification rule that is unaffected by
camera type.
C. Adversarial Attacks on Manufacturer Classifiers
To gain some insight into the effect that camera / label
correlations have on a trained model in terms of the patterns
it learns to recognize, we perform adversarial attacks on
trained models and visualize the perturbations that flip a
trained model’s judgement of an image from Manufacturer
2 to 1. Adversarial attacks are small perturbations to input
images, imperceptible to the human eye, which nonetheless
are sufficient to fool a model into classifying that image as
whatever the attacker wishes [24]. They are easily generated by
gradient ascent in image space, backpropagating the negative
log likelihood of the target label into the image pixels and
taking small steps in the direction of the resulting image
gradient until the model’s prediction favors our target (e.g.
see Nguyen et a. [19]). By performing this process using the
same image but different models and comparing the resulting
image perturbations, we can learn something about how those
models differ.
Figure 5 shows that strikingly different adversarial pertur-
bations are induced depending one which dataset the model
was trained on. Perturbations that fool the Balanced model
are focused around the batch code and other visible features
of the bottle, such as the plastic seam, whereas those that
Fig. 5. Adversarial perturbations applied to two images, classified by a ResNet34 model trained on the Balanced dataset (left) and the Disjoint dataset (right).
The left image in each pair shows the input image with the perturbation amplified for visibility and overlaid on top, while the right image shows just the
amplified perturbation itself. Strikingly different perturbations to the same image are observed depending on whether the model was trained without camera /
label correlations (Balanced) or with them (Disjoint). Best viewed digitally, zoomed in.
fool the Disjoint model show a characteristic pink / green
banding pattern in flat, featureless areas of the image. A
distinct rainbow-like band of perturbation is also visible along
the tops of images classified by the Disjoint model; these
banding patterns at the tops and in featureless areas of images
appear regardless of which input image the attack is performed
on.
Adversarial perturbations, when amplified for visibility,
usually look like uninterpretable noise bearing little apparent
resemblance to the target image class (e.g. Goodfellow et al.
[11]), so it is interesting to see so much structure in our case.
The appearance of banding patterns in flat regions provides
some evidence against chromatic aberration, which should
manifest at the edges of objects.
D. Classification of Binary Masks
As discussed in Section II, there is a finite set of image
features that may be used to infer the camera from which an
image originates. Since most of these features relate to color
distribution or high frequency detail (i.e. patterns detectable
within a small window), it seems likely that removal of these
features would render camera identification impossible, and
hence resolve the domain bias issues. To do this while pre-
serving features that are likely relevant for robust manufacturer
detection, we apply local mean thresholding to the images.
This yields a binary image that effectively segments the dots
of the batch codes while removing all elements of color and
texture (see Figure 6). Although lens distortion is typically
more prevalent near the edges of images,
As Table III shows, training on binary segmented images
does not yield usable results on the manufacturer detection or
camera classification tasks - in both cases, the test accuracy is
close to the level expected of random guessing. As expected,
we also observed no significant correlation between manu-
facturer classification test accuracy and camera type when
training on the Disjoint dataset with binary thresholding. This
largely rules out lens distortion or other large scale geometric
artifacts as the source of camera bias, since these distortions
would cause the dots to move and thus be visible in the binary
thresholded images.
E. Classification of Color Jittered Images
One hypothesis is that different cameras have subtly dif-
ferent color correction / white balancing settings, which a
CNN could very easy detect and exploit, especially since the
images were acquired in laboratory conditions with controlled
lighting. We test this hypothesis by randomizing the hue,
saturation, contrast and brightness of the images at training
time, thus removing any correlation between camera type and
global image color statistics. Table IV shows that even with
Fig. 6. A bottle image with local mean thresholding applied, segmenting the
batchcode dots. Origin camera classification does not work on such images,
indicating that models use something other than the shape and position of the
dots to classify cameras.
Model
Test Accuracy
Manufacturers Cameras
ResNet34 0.489 0.229
ResNet101 0.530 0.186
InceptionV3 0.525 0.270
Alexnet 0.499 0.214
VGG16 0.616 0.384
TABLE III
MANUFACTURER AND CAMERA CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON THE TEST
SET WHEN TRAINED (AND TESTED) ON BINARY SEGMENTED IMAGES (SEE
FIGURE 6).
the high level of color randomization used (see Figure 7),
camera and manufacturer classification test accuracy remains
high. Accuracy is somewhat diminished for the AlexNet and
VGG16 architectures, which require downsampled images as
input, suggesting that these features are still useful when high
frequency features are less available. We also train models
to recognize cameras from grayscale images, achieving test
accuracies roughly identical to those in Table IV.
F. Classifying Cameras from Small Image Patches
With lens deformation and color statistics ruled out as
camera identifying features, we turn our attention towards
high frequency features. As discussed in Section II, such
Fig. 7. Color jitter augmentations applied to a single image (original in top
left). Augmenting our training images with basic color distortions removes any
correlations that may exist between class label and white balance, saturation,
hue.
Model
Test Accuracy
Manufacturers Cameras
ResNet34 0.975 0.992
ResNet101 0.961 0.995
InceptionV3 0.974 0.998
Alexnet 0.923 0.768
VGG16 0.972 0.883
TABLE IV
MANUFACTURER AND CAMERA CLASSIFICATION TEST SET ACCURACY
WHEN TRAINED ON IMAGES WITH RANDOMIZED HUE, SATURATION,
CONTRAST AND BRIGHTNESS. ROBUST CAMERA CLASSIFICATION
ACCURACY IMPLIES THAT IMAGE COLOR STATISTICS ARE NOT
NECESSARY FOR CAMERA INFERENCE.
features could be introduced by various forms of fixed sensor
pattern noise, dust particles stuck to the lens, and image
processing / compression algorithms performed automatically
by the camera. We investigate the role of high frequency
features by training CNNs to classify cameras given only a
random 32×32 crop of our original input images (upsampled
to 224 × 224 for Alexnet and VGG16). As Table V shows,
camera identification accuracy remains surprisingly robust
even when input is restricted to a 32 × 32 window. This
strongly implies that high frequency features are sufficient
for camera identification, and confirms that lens distortion
is not required. However, it remains unclear whether these
features are localized to certain regions of the image or present
uniformly. Figure 8 shows an accuracy heatmap, constructed
by repeatedly sampling 32 × 32 crops from our training set
and drawing a white square at the location of each correctly
classified crop. This shows that classification accuracy is
independent of the location of the crop, at least when averaged
over the whole dataset. This implies that whatever pattern
is being exploited occurs uniformly across the images on
average. Figure 9 shows how classification accuracy for 32×32
crops varies across five individual images, one from each
camera.
Model Test Accuracy
ResNet34 0.665
ResNet101 0.681
InceptionV3 0.948
AlexNet 0.770
VGG16 0.872
TABLE V
CAMERA CLASSIFICATION TEST ACCURACY WHEN TRAINED ONLY ON
RANDOM 32× 32 CROPS OF THE INPUT DATA.
G. Generalizing from Left Field of View to Right
Pixel non-uniformity (PNU) noise, as described in [16], is
a high frequency noise fingerprint, manifested as randomly
varying sensitivities of individual sensor pixels to light. We
would expect such a noise fingerprint to be non-repeating, that
is, the noise pattern in one part of an image should be different
to that in other parts. If the models are learning to recognize
cameras by recognizing their PNU noise fingerprints, they
Fig. 8. Heatmap representing relative classification accuracy of 32×32 crops
at different locations in the image, averaged across images from the whole
dataset. The lack of bias toward any particular part of the image implies that
camera predictive patterns are present uniformly across the images.
should therefore be incapable of recognizing cameras from
patches of noise fingerprint they have not encountered during
training. We therefore test our models’ reliance on PNU noise
by training them on only the left halves of our Balanced
training set images, and testing on the right halves. If they are
reliant on PNU noise then generalization to the right halves
of images should be poor. As Table VI shows, this is not the
case, therefore PNU noise is unlikely to be the primary source
of camera identifying information.
Model Test Accuracy
ResNet34 0.992
ResNet101 0.889
InceptionV3 0.999
AlexNet 0.818
VGG16 0.851
TABLE VI
CAMERA CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON RIGHT HALVES OF IMAGES
AFTER TRAINING ON THE LEFT HALVES. STRONG GENERALIZATION TO AN
UNSEEN AREA OF THE TRAINING IMAGES IMPLIES THAT PNU NOISE
FINGERPRINTS OF THE SORT DISCUSSED BY LUKAS ET AL. [16] ARE
UNLIKELY TO BE THE MECHANISM BY WHICH CNNS ARE RECOGNIZING
CAMERAS, BECAUSE THE NOISE FINGERPRINT ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE
IMAGES WILL BE DIFFERENT TO THAT ON THE LEFT SIDE.
V. CONCLUSION
We have shown that CNNs learn to exploit camera / class
label correlations in an image classification dataset in which
such correlations are present. By recognizing the camera that
acquired an image, CNNs are able to infer the class label
without learning any features that are relevant to the task (in
our case, manufacturer classification), as evidenced by poor
generalization to images where the camera / label correlation
is broken. This finding has relevance both to fine grained clas-
sification and to algorithmic transparency and accountability.
We also show that CNNs are capable of learning to infer origin
cameras when explicitly trained to do so, corroborating the
results of Bondi et al. and Tuama et al. [1], [25]. We test these
phenomena across five different CNN architectures and show
that the effects are common to all of them, although lesser
among AlexNet and VGG16, the two architectures whose
Fig. 9. Heatmaps representing the camera identification accuracy on 32×32
patches at different locations in single images. An image from each camera
is shown, and the predictions are all from the same ResNet34 checkpoint.
The model is able to correctly classify patches from most locations on most
images, but some significant dark patches occur.
inputs must be downsampled to a smaller size due to the use
of fully connected layers. We have also performed a number
of experiments to gain insight into how CNNs are recognizing
cameras, the results of which require some discussion in this
section. Section II outlines a number of potential sources of
camera identifying information, and our experiments provide
evidence for and against those hypotheses.
A simple explanation for camera bias would be differences
in average color statistics among cameras, caused by differ-
ences in white balance and color correction settings. This
hypothesis is largely ruled out by the fact that CNNs still
recognize cameras easily even when hue, saturation, contrast
and brightness are randomized (see Figure 7, Table IV).
Another potential explanation was lens distortion; if different
cameras have different shaped lenses then there may be slight
differences in geometric distortion (e.g. radial lens distortion
[2]). This hypothesis too is ruled out, by the fact that CNNs
are incapable of inferring cameras from binary segmented
images (see Figure 6, Table III). Geometric distortions would
be visible in the spacing of the dots from the batch codes,
which are the only features visible in these images. Chromatic
aberration is also unlikely since it should only be visible at the
edges of objects, not in flat regions (Figure 5,9), and should
also be undetectable in grayscale images (Section IV-E). These
results increase the likelihood that texture, which is absent in
segmented images but preserved in color randomized images,
plays an important role. High camera recognition accuracy on
32× 32 random crops (Table V), including in empty patches
of the image where it is hard to imagine what features besides
faint, high frequency texture are available (Figure 9), increases
this likelihood further.
There are two likely sources of camera correlated texture:
pixel non-uniformity (PNU) noise, and the camera’s on-board
image processing, which typically includes algorithms such
as kernel filtering, image sharpening and compression (both
discussed by Lukas et al. [16]). PNU noise is dominated
by a fixed multiplicative noise pattern that is introduced
during manufacturing, as such we would expect different noise
patterns in different parts of the field of view, as opposed to
a repeating pattern. The fact that CNNs trained on the left
hand sides of images generalize well to the right hand sides
of those images (Table VI) therefore implies that PNU noise
is not crucial for camera recognition, since they should not
be able to recognize unseen noise patterns on the right side of
the images. The fact that AlexNet and VGG16 are also able to
recognize cameras from downsampled images is also strong
evidence against PNU noise, which should be undetectable
after downsampling.
By a process of elimination, the most likely explanation
therefore seems to be on-camera image processing algorithms.
We do not consider these results to be conclusive; a conclusive
answer would require full knowledge of the original cameras,
which we do not have. Further research is required to ascertain
exactly which textural features are exploited by CNNs to
recognize cameras.
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